This paper presents a new attack, called the watermark template attack, for watermarked images. In contrast to the Stirmark benchmark [1] [2] , this attack does not severely reduce the quality ofthe image. This atack maintains, therefore, the commercial value of the watermarked image. In contrast to previous approaches [3] [4] , it is not the aim of the attack to change the statistics of embedded watermarks fooling the &tection process but to utilize specific concepts that have been recently developed for more mbust watermarking schemes. The attack estimates the corresponding template points in the FFT domain and then removes them using local interpolation. We demonstrate the effetiveness of the attack showing different test cases that have been watermarked with commercial available watermark products. The approach presented is not limited to the FFT domain. Other transformation domains may be also exploited by very similar variants of the described attack.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright infringements of digital images can be dtected by digital watermarks, embedded by special software programs. Visible and invisible watermarks may be applied for copyright protectionVisible watermarks direct the observer to the fact that the image is copyright protected. The invisible watermark utilizes the inability ofthe human vision system to perceive small differences in optical data. These slight differences are exploited by special software programs for embedding copyright inforntttion directly into the images. Invisible and robust watermarks have the advantage that they can not be identified and destroyed easily ifthe watermark process is robust against specific image transformations such as lossy compression, change of contrast, vector quantization, rotation, scaling, translation, cropping, change of £pect ratio, color editing, and morphing. A lot ofnew approaches [14, 15] have been proposed by academia and industry to derive and to develop watermarking systems that are robust and satisfy the requirement to recocer the watermark after any affine transformations.Along this development, different schemes have been proposed [6] [7] [8] that are based on so-called templates. These templates are a synchronization pattern that enables the estimation ofthe applied affine transformation. Based on this estimation, the inverse transformation can be applied and then the watermark estimated and recovered. The following two figures illustrate such templates applied for different types of watermarking technologies [6, 7] . The results achieved by utilizing synchronization patterns with respect to performance and the robustness against affine transformation are convincing. Three schemes [6] [7] [8] , developed between 1996 and 1999, had a leading score rating in the Stirmark benchmark. Although a lot of progress has been made for more robust schemes utilizing these templates, a system security aspect has been totally ignored. If these templates have characteristic features that are independent from the specific image, then these charcatseristics can be exploited to derive a new attack that has severe consequences to the performance and robustness of the different watermark technologies. This attack, called the watermark template attack, identifies the specific features of a template and partly removes the specific template to fool the synchronization process applied during the detection process. The attack presented in this paper requires no key knowledge.
TEMPLATE USAGE
The template contains no information but is merely a tool or synchronization pattern applied to recover possible affine transformations of the watermarked image. The watermark detection process is based on a two phases. First we determine the affine transformation (if any) undergone by the watermarked image, then we invert the transformation and decode the watermark.
Embedding the Template: The template applied during the marking process is very specific to the watermarking technology. Depending on features of the specific watermark technology, there are different strategies for the template generation. We dont need to know how the specific template in a domain is constructed from the perspective of a counterfeiter, since the template applied will always generate some peaks in the traget domain used for the template. Some approaches [7] use a template of approximately 25 points. The points of the template are uniformly distributed in the DFT domain with the low frequencies being excluded. The points are chosen pseudo-randomly based on a secret key. The low frequencies are excluded since they contain the bulk of the spectral power and represent noise during the decoding process. The strength of the template is determined adaptively as well. A good visible quality and performance can be achieved if we embed insertpoints at a strength equal to the local average value of DFT points plus one standard deviation. Points in the high frequencies are inserted less strongly since in these regions the average value of the high frequencies is usually lower than the average value of the low frequencies.
Detecting the Template: Some approaches [7] transform the template matching problem into a point-matching problem. After this problem has been solved, the top candidates for the template points are identified. If an affine transformation has been applied, the identified template poiints will differ from the orginal ones. Thishange is exploited to estimate the applied affine transformation. The corresponding inverse affine transformation is then applied for a better synchronization of the watermark.
WATERMARKING ATTACKS
Following the attack classification [5, 9] , we distinguish between four different classes of attacks: Removal attacks, geometrical attacks, cryptographic attacks, and protocol attacks.
Removal attacks remove a watermark from the watermarked data. These approaches consider the inserted watermark as noise with a given statistics and estimate the original, non watermarked data from the watermarked data. Based on a maximum a posteriori watermark estimation a remodulation of the watermark is applied such that a modified distribution is generated that has the least favorable noise distribution for the watermark detector. Geometrical attacks do not to remove the embedded watermark, but distort by alterations the watermarked data. The attacks are usually applied such that the watermark detector looses synchronization with the embedded information. The watermark is still in the data but the verification process is fooled since it cant resynchronize the data given with the embedded watermark.
Cryptographic attacks do not exploit the very specific embedding or detection process. Based on exhaustive key search approaches, they try to guess the key applied for the embedding. If such a key has been found, the watermark can be overwritten. Other approaches try to fool the generation of the random vectors to predict the positions of the modufied pixels.
The protocol attacks generate protocol ambigiuties in the watermark process. Typically examples are the copy attack [101 and the approach to find a inverse mapping from the watermarked data [13] . The purpose of this attack is to generate ambigious original data that does not correspond to the same orginal data the copyright owner had to generate the watermarked data.
The template attack partly destroyes the snychonization pattern of the watermarked data. If an affine transformation has been applied on the protected data, this transformation cant be recovered. The template attack, belongs, therefore, to the class of the geometrical attacks.
THE WATERMARK TEMPLATE ATTACK
The scheme ofthe attack can be easily derived. Our main goal is to destroy without any key knowledge the synchronization pattern ofthe watermark such that we can fool later the detection process after an affine transformation ofthe image has been applied. The attack has the following phases: Phase 1
• Read the watermarked image and apply a median filter (Wiener filter is als adequate) to estimate the original image.
• Subtract the estimated orginal image from the watermarked image and store the result.
Phase 2:
• Compute the discrete Fourier transform.
• Identify the maximum peaks.
• Modify the amplitude of the maximum peaks by replacing the specifi amplitude with the average amplitude value of the neigbours within considered window (window size is a system parameter).
• Compute the inverse discrete Fourier transform after the amplitude of the peaks have been modified and write the result in a new file. This file is the attacke image.
This attack utilizes latest results in the atermarking domain, since there are only a very few watermark schemes that have a robust detection for a 64 bit watermark against any affine transformations such as change of aspect atio, scaling, or rotation. Different tests have shown that the attack may even break the detection process of some watermarking technologies if no affine transformation was applied. The following figures illustrate a simple example (technology from a Us manufacturer, integrated in Photoshop Version 5.5, application domain: currency protection). Figure 3 shows the original image, Figure 4 shows the watermarked image (highest durability with verification), Figure 5 shows the template of the watermarked image, Figure 6 shows the watermarked image after the template attack, Figure 7 shows the template of the attacked image, Figure 8 shows the attacked image after the rotation and Figure 9 shows the failed detection message. The quality of the image after the attack can be improved applying some denoising or restoration techniques. For the target application domain, this is not necessary, since currency notes are exchanged in daily life with usage dependent quality factors. Currency protection by digital watermarks is a new application field that is investigated by different groups from academia and industry. 
RESULTS
We have run numerous test cases to check how often the above described attack can be successfully applied. Based on the provided data from the Stirmark benchmark and the commercial markd ,we have tested the performance of the attack for a representative set of different image classes. After the tests we have noticed that there was not a single example the attack was not successful. The tests have been performed with different watermarking systems from academia and industry. Sometimes, the result of the attack was so severe that it was not necessary to apply an affine transformation in a postprocessing step. For example, the watermark could not be detected for many images applying the commercial solution of an US manufacturer in Photoshop 5.0. Since the Stirmark benchmark images are quite known, we have listed in the appendix of the paper only the test results of a subset from our test cases. During the tests we have also realized that some manufactures have slightly changed the structure of the template from one product version to the other. This chnage of the template construction had no impact on our tests since the attack does not depend on the specific construction procedure of the template in the FFT domain.
CONCLUSIONS
The watermark template attack is a new attack against template based watermarking systems. The attack exploits parts of the specific algorithm concept of the watermarking technology and damages the applied template, i.e. the synchronization pattern, such that the detector is not able to identify the type of affine transformation applied. Since the template based approaches try to reduce the number of embedded information that constitute the template to avoid potential visible artifacts, the attack described in this paper is very efficient. This attack has a severe influence on the good rating in the Stirmark benchmark for the template based watermarking systems.If a technology does not resist to the template attack, a user in his role of the copyright owner has to face very similar threats and risks as with a different watermark technology that is less robust against affine transformations. We have shown by different test cases of different image classes that advanced and commercially available watermarking systems are not robust against this new attack.
We are currently working on self-referencing and repetitive watermarking schemes [1 0-12] that are resistant against the template attack and allow to recover the watermark from any affine transforms.
I Since the images applied in the Stirmark benchmark do not always share the same properties as commercial images, we have used in our tests also some professional images from Fratelli Alinary, which have been given to us for testing and benchmarking purposes. We would like to thank Fratelli Alinari, especially Mr. Andrea de Polo, for providing these test images. Fratelli Alinari is the copyright holder of these images. These images may not be used for any business purpose without the written permission of Fratelli Alinari, http//www.alinari.com. 
